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ABSTRACT 
Successful negotiators prepare by determining their position 
along five dimensions: Legitimacy, Options, Goals, Indepen-
dence, and Commitment, (LOGIC). We introduce a negoti-
ation model based on these dimensions and on two primitive 
concepts: intimacy (degree of closeness) and balance (degree 
of fairness). The intimacy is a pair of matrices that eval-
uate both an agent's contribution to the relationship and 
its opponent's contribution each from an information view 
and from a utilitarian view across the five LOGIC dimen-
sions. The balance is the difference between these matri-
ces. A relationship strategy maintains a target intimacy for 
each relationship that an agent would like the relationship to 
move towards in future. The negotiation strategy maintains 
a set of Options that are in-line with the current intimacy 
level, and then tactics wrap the Options in argumentation 
with the aim of attaining a successful deal and manipulat-
ing the successive negotiation balances towards the target 
intimacy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we propose a new negotiation model to deal 
with long term relationships that are founded on successive 
negotiation encounters. The model is grounded on results 
from business and psychological studies [1, 16, 9], and ac-
knowledges that negotiation is an information exchange pro-
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cess as well as a utility exchange process [15, 14]. We be-
lieve that if agents are to succeed in real application domains 
they have to reconcile both views: informational and game-
theoretical. Our aim is to model trading scenarios where 
agents represent their human principals, and thus we want 
their behaviour to be comprehensible by humans and to re-
spect usual human negotiation procedures, whilst being con-
sistent with, and somehow extending, game theoretical and 
information theoretical results. In this sense, agents are not 
just utility maximisers, but aim at building long lasting rela-
tionships with progressing levels of intimacy that determine 
what balance in information and resource sharing is accept-
able to them. These two concepts, intimacy and balance are 
key in the model, and enable us to understand competitive 
and co-operative game theory as two particular theories of 
agent relationships (i.e. at different intimacy levels). These 
two theories are too specific and distinct to describe how 
a (business) relationship might grow because interactions 
have some aspects of these two extremes on a continuum in 
which, for example, agents reveal increasing amounts of pri-
vate information as their intimacy grows. We don't follow 
the 'Co-Opetition' aproach [4] where co-operation and com-
petition depend on the issue under negotiation, but instead 
we belief that the willingness to co-operate/compete affect 
all aspects in the negotiation process. Negotiation strategies 
can naturally be seen as procedures that select tactics used 
to attain a successful deal and to reach a target intimacy 
level. It is common in human settings to use tactics that 
compensate for unbalances in one dimension of a negotia-
tion with unbalances in another dimension. In this sense, 
humans aim at a general sense of fairness in an interaction. 
In Section 2 we outline the aspects of human negotiation 
modelling that we cover in this work. Then, in Section 3 
we introduce the negotiation language. Section 4 explains 
in outline the architecture and the concepts of intimacy and 
balance, and how they influence the negotiation. Section 5 
contains a description of the different metrics used in the 
agent model including intimacy. Finally, Section 6 outlines 
how strategies and tactics use the LOGIC framework, inti-
macy and balance. 
2. HUMAN NEGOTIATION 
Before a negotiation starts human negotiators prepare the 
dialogic exchanges that can be made along the five LOGIC 
dimensions [7]: 
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• Legitimacy. What information is relevant to the nego-
tiation process? What are the persuasive arguments 
about the fairness of the options? 
• Options. What are the possible agreements we can 
accept? 
• Goals. What are the underlying things we need or care 
about? What are our goals? 
• Independence. What will we do if the negotiation fails? 
What alternatives have we got? 
• Commitment. What outstanding commitments do we 
have? 
Negotiation dialogues, in this context, exchange dialogi-
cal moves, i.e. messages, with the intention of getting in-
formation about the opponent or giving away information 
about us along these five dimensions: request for informa-
tion, propose options, inform about interests, issue promises, 
appeal to standards ... A key part of any negotiation process 
is to build a model of our opponent(s) along these dimen-
sions. All utterances agents make during a negotiation give 
away information about their current LOGIC model, that 
is, about their legitimacy, options, goals, independence, and 
commitments. Also, several utterances can have a utilitar-
ian interpretation in the sense that an agent can associate 
a preferential gain to them. For instance, an offer may in-
form our negotiation opponent about our willingness to sign 
a contract in the terms expressed in the offer, and at the 
same time the opponent can compute what is its associated 
expected utilitarian gain. These two views: information-
based and utility-based, are central in the model proposed 
in this paper. 
2.1 Intimacy and Balance in relationships 
There is evidence from psychological studies that humans 
seek a balance in their negotiation relationships. The clas-
sical view [1] is that people perceive resource allocations as 
being distributively fair (i.e. well balanced) if they are pro-
portional to inputs or contributions (i.e. equitable). How-
ever, more recent studies [16, 17] show that humans follow 
a richer set of norms of distributive justice depending on 
their intimacy level: equity, equality, and need. Equity be-
ing the allocation proportional to the effort (e.g. the profit 
of a company goes to the stock holders proportional to their 
investment), equality being the allocation in equal amounts 
(e.g. two friends eat the same amount of a cake cooked by 
one of them), and need being the allocation proportional to 
the need for the resource (e.g. in case of food scarcity, a 
mother gives all food to her baby). For instance, if we are in 
a purely economic setting (low intimacy) we might request 
equity for the Options dimension but could accept equality 
in the Goals dimension. 
The perception of a relation being in balance (i.e. fair) 
depends strongly on the nature of the social relationships 
between individuals (i.e. the intimacy level). In purely eco-
nomical relationships (e.g., business), equity is perceived as 
more fair; in relations where joint action or fostering of social 
relationships are the goal (e.g. friends), equality is perceived 
as more fair; and in situations where personal development 
or personal welfare are the goal (e.g. family), allocations are 
usually based on need. 
We believe that the perception of balance in dialogues (in 
negotiation or otherwise) is grounded on social relationships, 
and that every dimension of an interaction between humans 
can be correlated to the social closeness, or intimacy, be-
tween the parties involved. According to the previous stud-
ies, the more intimacy across the five LOGIC dimensions the 
more the need norm is used, and the less intimacy the more 
the equity norm is used. This might be part of our social 
evolution. There is ample evidence that when human soci-
eties evolved from a hunter-gatherer structure1 to a shelter-
based one2 the probability of survival increased when food 
was scarce. 
In this context, we can clearly see that, for instance, fami-
lies exchange not only goods but also information and knowl-
edge based on need, and that few families would consider 
their relationships as being unbalanced, and thus unfair, 
when there is a strong asymmetry in the exchanges (a mother 
explaining everything to her children, or buying toys, does 
not expect reciprocity). In the case of partners there is some 
evidence [3] that the allocations of goods and burdens (i.e. 
positive and negative utilities) are perceived as fair, or in 
balance, based on equity for burdens and equality for goods. 
See Table 1 for some examples of desired balances along the 
LOGIC dimensions. 
The perceived balance in a negotiation dialogue allows ne-
gotiators to infer information about their opponent, about 
its LOGIC stance, and to compare their relationships with 
all negotiators. For instance, if we perceive that every time 
we request information it is provided, and that no significant 
questions are returned, or no complaints about not receiv-
ing information are given, then that probably means that 
our opponent perceives our social relationship to be very 
close. Alternatively, we can detect what issues are causing 
a burden to our opponent by observing an imbalance in the 
information or utilitarian senses on that issue. 
3. COMMUNICATION MODEL 
3.1 Ontology 
In order to define a language to structure agent dialogues we 
need an ontology that includes a (minimum) repertoire of el-
ements: a set of concepts (e.g. quantity, quality, material) 
organised in a is-a hierarchy (e.g. platypus is a mammal, 
Australian-dollar is a currency), and a set of relations over 
these concepts (e.g. price(beer,AUD)). 3 We model ontolo-
gies following an algebraic approach [8] as: 
An ontology is a tuple 0 = (C, R, :::;, a) where: 
1. C is a finite set of concept symbols (including basic 
data types); 
2. R is a finite set of relation symbols; 
3. ::0: is a reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric relation 
on C (a partial order) 
4. a : R -> c+ is the function assigning to each relation 
symbol its arity 
1 In its purest form, individuals in these societies collect food 
and consume it when and where it is found. This is a pure 
equity sharing of the resources, the gain is proportional to 
the effort. 
2In these societies there are family units, around a shelter, 
that represent the basic food sharing structure. Usually, 
food is accumulated at the shelter for future use. Then the 
food intake depends more on the need of the members. 
3 Usually, a set of axioms defined over the concepts and re-
lations is also required. We will omit this here. 
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Element A new trading partner my butcher my boss my partner my children 
Legitimacy equity equity equity equality need 
Options equity equity equity mixed" need 
Goals equity need equity need need 
Independence equity equity equality need need 
Commitment equity equity equity mixed need 
"equity on burden, equality on good 
Table 1: Some desired balances (sense of fairness) examples depending on the relationship. 
where :::; is the traditional is-a hierarchy. To simplify com-
putations in the computing of probability distributions we 
assume that there is a number of disjoint is-a trees covering 
different ontological spaces (e.g. a tree for types of fabric, 
a tree for shapes of clothing, and so on). R contains rela-
tions between the concepts in the hierarchy, this is needed 
to define 'objects' (e.g. deals) that are defined as a tuple of 
issues. 
The semantic distance between concepts within an on-
tology depends on how far away they are in the structure 
defined by the :::; relation. Semantic distance plays a funda-
mental role in strategies for information-based agency. How 
signed contracts, Commit(-), about objects in a particular 
semantic region, and their execution, Done(·), affect our 
decision making process about signing future contracts in 
nearby semantic regions is crucial to modelling the common 
sense that human beings apply in managing trading rela-
tionships. A measure [10] bases the semantic similarity be-
tween two concepts on the path length induced by :::; (more 
distance in the:::; graph means less semantic similarity), and 
the depth of the subsumer concept (common ancestor) in the 
shortest path between the two concepts (the deeper in the 
hierarchy, the closer the meaning of the concepts). Semantic 
similarity is then defined as: 
where l is the length (i.e. number of hops) of the short-
est path between the concepts, h is the depth of the deepest 
concept subsuming both concepts, and "1 and "2 are param-
eters scaling the contributions of the shortest path length 
and the depth respectively. 
3.2 Language 
The shape of the language that a uses to represent the infor-
mation received and the content of its dialogues depends on 
two fundamental notions. First, when agents interact within 
an overarching institution they explicitly or implicitly accept 
the norms that will constrain their behaviour, and accept 
the established sanctions and penalties whenever norms are 
violated. Second, the dialogues in which a engages are built 
around two fundamental actions: (i) passing information, 
and (ii) exchanging proposals and contracts. A contract 
8 = (a, b) between agents a and f3 is a pair where a and b 
represent the actions that agents a and f3 are responsible 
for respectively. Contracts signed by agents and informa-
tion passed by agents, are similar to norms in the sense that 
they oblige agents to behave in a particular way, so as to 
satisfy the conditions of the contract, or to make the world 
consistent with the information passed. Contracts and In-
formation can thus be thought of as normative statements 
that restrict an agent's behaviour. 
Norms, contracts, and information have an obvious tem-
poral dimension. Thus, an agent has to abide by a norm 
while it is inside an institution, a contract has a validity 
period, and a piece of information is true only during an 
interval in time. The set of norms affecting the behaviour of 
an agent defines the context that the agent has to take into 
account. 
a's communication language has two fundamental primi-
tives: Commit(a, (3, <p) to represent, in <p, the world that a 
aims at bringing about and that f3 has the right to verify, 
complain about or claim compensation for any deviations 
from, and Done(Jt) to represent the event that a certain 
action Jl-4 has taken place. In this way, norms, contracts, 
and information chunks will be represented as instances of 
Commit(·) where a and f3 can be individual agents or insti-
tutions. C is: 
Jt ::= illoc(a, (3, <p, t) I Jt; Jt I 
Let context In Jt End 
<p ::=term I Done(Jt) I Commit(a, (3, <p) I <p A <p I 
<p V <p I ~<p I Vv.<pv I :lv.<pv 
context::= <p I id = <p I prolog_clause I context; context 
where 'Pv is a formula with free variable v, illoc is any ap-
propriate set of illocutionary particles,';' means sequencing, 
and context represents either previous agreements, previous 
illocutions, the ontological working context, that is a pro-
jection of the ontological trees that represent the focus of 
the conversation, or code that aligns the ontological differ-
ences between the speakers needed to interpret an action 
a. Representing an ontology as a set predicates in Prolog 
is simple. The set term contains instances of the ontology 
concepts and relations. 5 
For example, we can represent the following offer: "If you 
spend a total of more than €100 in my shop during Oc-
tober then I will give you a 10% discount on all goods in 
November", as: 
Offer( a, (3,spent(f3, a, October, X) A X 2': €100 _, 
V y. Done(Inform(€, a, pay((3, a, y), November)) _, 
Commit(a, (3, discount(y,10%))) 
€ is an institution agent that reports the payment. 
4Without loss of generality we will assume that all actions 
are dialogical. 
5We assume the convention that C(c) means that c is an 
instance of concept C and r ( c1 , ... , Cn) implicitly determines 
that c; is an instance of the concept in the i-th position of 
the relation r. 
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Figure 1: The LOGIC agent architecture 
Full Interaction History 
4. AGENT ARCHITECTURE 
A multiagent system {a,/31, ... ,/3n,~,Bl, ... ,B,}, contains 
an agent a that interacts with other argumentation agents, 
/3;, information providing agents, Bj, and an institutional 
agent, ~, that represents the institution where we assume 
the interactions happen [2]. The institutional agent reports 
promptly and honestly on what actually occurs after an 
agent signs a contract, or makes some other form of com-
mitment. In Section 4.1 this enables us to measure the dif-
ference between an utterance and a subsequent observation. 
The communication language C introduced in Section 3.2 en-
ables us both to structure the dialogues and to structure the 
processing of the information gathered by agents. Agents 
have a probabilistic first-order internal language C used to 
represent a world model, M'. A generic information-based 
architecture is described in detail in [15]. 
The LOGIC agent architecture is shown in Figure 1. Agent 
a acts in response to a need that is expressed in terms of the 
ontology. A need may be exogenous such as a need to trade 
profitably and may be triggered by another agent offering to 
trade, or endogenous such as a deciding that it owns more 
wine than it requires. Needs trigger a's goal/plan proac-
tive reasoning, while other messages are dealt with by a's 
reactive reasoning. 6 Each plan prepares for the negotiation 
by assembling the contents of a 'LOGIC briefcase' that the 
agent 'carries' into the negotiation7 . The relationship strat-
egy determines which agent to negotiate with for a given 
need; it uses risk management analysis to preserve a strate-
gic set of trading relationships for each mission-critical need 
- this is not detailed here. For each trading relationship 
this strategy generates a relationship target that is expressed 
in the LOGIC framework as a desired level of intimacy to 
be achieved in the long term. 
Each negotiation consists of a dialogue, Ill', between two 
agents with agent a contributing utterance JL and the part-
6 Each of a's plans and reactions contain constructors for an 
initial world model M'. M' is then maintained from per-
cepts received using update functions that transform per-
cepts into constraints on M' - for details, see [14, 15]. 
7 Empirical evidence shows that in human negotiation, bet-
ter outcomes are achieved by skewing the opening Options 
in favour of the proposer. We are unaware of any empiri-
cal investigation of this hypothesis for autonomous agents 
in real trading scenarios. 
ner f3 contributing JL1 using the language described in Sec-
tion 3.2. Each dialogue, Ill', is evaluated using the LOGIC 
framework in terms of the value of Ill' to both a and f3- see 
Section 5.2. The negotiation strategy then determines the 
current set of Options { D;}, and then the tactics, guided by 
the negotiation target, decide which, if any, of these Options 
to put forward and wraps them in argumentation dialogue 
- see Section 6. We now describe two of the distributions 
in M' that support offer exchange. 
IP''(acc(a, /3, x, D)) estimates the probability that a should 
accept proposal D in satisfaction of her need x, where D = 
(a, b) is a pair of commitments, a for a and b for /3. a will 
accept D if: IP''(acc(a, /3, x, D)) > c, for level of certainty c. 
This estimate is compounded from subjective and objective 
views of acceptability. The subjective estimate takes account 
of: the extent to which the enactment of D will satisfy a's 
need x, how much Dis 'worth' to a, and the extent to which 
a believes that she will be in a position to execute her com-
mitment a [14, 15]. Sa(/3, a) is a random variable denoting 
a's estimate of f3's subjective valuation of a over some finite, 
numerical evaluation space. The objective estimate captures 
whether D is acceptable on the open market, and variable 
Ua(b) denotes a's open-market valuation of the enactment 
of commitment b, again taken over some finite numerical val-
uation space. We also consider needs, the variable Ta (/3, a) 
denotes a's estimate of the strength of f3's motivating need 
for the enactment of commitment a over a valuation space. 
Then forD= (a, b): IP''(acc(a, /3, x, D))= 
IP'' ( (Ta(/3, a)) h X ( Sa(a, b)) 9 X U,(b) > s) (1) T,(a,b) S,(f3,a) U,(a)-
where g E [0, 1] is a's greed, h E [0, 1] is a's degree of al-
truism, and s :::::: 1 is derived from the stance8 described in 
Section 6. The parameters g and h are independent. We can 
imagine a relationship that begins with g = 1 and h = 0. 
Then as the agents share increasing amounts of their in-
formation about their open market valuations g gradually 
reduces to 0, and then as they share increasing amounts of 
information about their needs h increases to 1. The basis 
for the acceptance criterion has thus developed from equity 
to equality, and then to need. 
IP''(acc(/3, a, D)) estimates the probability that f3 would 
accept D, by observing f3's responses. For example, if f3 
sends the message Offer(D1) then a derives the constraint: 
{IP''(acc(/3, a, D1)) = 1} on the distribution IP''(/3, a, D), and 
if this is a counter offer to a former offer of a's, Do, then: 
{IP''(acc(/3, a, Do)) = 0}. In the not-atypical special case of 
multi-issue bargaining where the agents' preferences over the 
individual issues only are known and are complementary to 
each other's, maximum entropy reasoning can be applied 
to estimate the probability that any multi-issue D will be 
acceptable to f3 by enumerating the possible worlds that 
represent f3's "limit of acceptability" [6]. 
4.1 Updating the World Model M' 
a's world model consists of probability distributions that 
represent its uncertainty in the world state. a is interested 
8If a chooses to inflate her opening Options then this is 
achieved in Section 6 by increasing the value of s. If s » 1 
then a deal may not be possible. This illustrates the well-
known inefficiency of bilateral bargaining established ana-
lytically by Myerson and Satterthwaite in 1983. 
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in the degree to which an utterance accurately describes 
what will subsequently be observed. All observations about 
the world are received as utterances from an all-truthful in-
stitution agent ~. For example, if f3 communicates the goal 
"I am hungry" and the subsequent negotiation terminates 
with f3 purchasing a book from a (by ~ advising a that a 
certain amount of money has been credited to a's account) 
then a may conclude that the goal that f3 chose to satisfy 
was something other than hunger. So, a's world model con-
tains probability distributions that represent its uncertain 
expectations of what will be observed on the basis of utter-
ances received. 
We represent the relationship between utterance, <p, and 
subsequent observation, <p1 , by IP'' ( <p1 I'P) E M', where <p1 and 
<p may be ontological categories in the interest of computa-
tional feasibility. For example, if <p is "I will deliver a bucket 
of fish to you tomorrow" then the distribution IP'(<p'I'P) need 
not be over all possible things that f3 might do, but could 
be over ontological categories that summarise f3's possible 
actions. 
In the absence of in-coming utterances, the conditional 
probabilities, IP'' ( <p1 I <p), should tend to ignorance as repre-
sented by a decay limit distribution Illl(<p'l<p). a may have 
background knowledge concerning Illl(<p'I'P) as t --> oo, oth-
erwise a may assume that it has maximum entropy whilst 
being consistent with the data. In general, given a distribu-
tion, IP''(Xi), and a decay limit distribution Illl(Xi), IP''(Xi) 
decays by: 
(2) 
where f:l.i is the decay function for the xi satisfying the 
property that limt~oo IP''(Xi) = Illl(Xi)· For example, f:l.i 
could be linear: IP''+1(Xi) = (1- vi) x Illl(Xi) +Vi x IP''(Xi), 
where Vi < 1 is the decay rate for the i'th distribution. 
Either the decay function or the decay limit distribution 
could also be a function of time: t>.l and Illl'(Xi)· 
Suppose that a receives an utterance J1. = illoc(a, (3, <p, t) 
from agent f3 at time t. Suppose that a attaches an epis-
temic belief IR'(a, (3, Jl.) to J1.- this probability takes account 
of a's level of personal caution. We model the update of 
IP''('P'I'P) in two cases, one for observations given <p, second 
for observations given ¢ in the semantic neighbourhood of 
'P· 
4.2 Update ofli''('P'I'P) given 'P 
First, if 'Pk is observed then a may set IP''+l ( 'Pk I'P) to some 
value d where { <p 1 , 'P2, ... , 'Pm} is the set of all possible 
observations. We estimate the complete posterior distri-
bution IP't+1(<p'I'P) by applying the principle of minimum 
relative entropy9 as follows. Let P(p.) be the distribution: 
9 Given a probability distribution ij, the minimum relative 
entropy distribution p = (p1, ... ,pr) subject to a set of J 
linear constraints§= {gi(PJ = aj · p- Cj = O},j = 1, ... , J 
(that must include the constraint LiPi- 1 = 0) is: p = 
argmin,. Lj ri log~- This may be calculated by introduc-
ing Lagrange multipliers X: L(p, X) = Lj Pi log ~ + X · §. 
Minimising L, {tf = gi(PJ = O},j = 1, ... ,J is the set of 
' given constraints §, and a solution to g;. = 0, i = 1, ... , I 
leads eventually to p. Entropy-based inference is a form of 
Bayesian inference that is convenient when the data is sparse 
[5] and encapsulates common-sense reasoning [12]. 
argmin;; Lj Xj log P'(;/I'P); that satisfies the constraint P(p.)k 
= d. Then let ii{,.) be the distribution: 
ii(,.) = JR'(a, (3, Jl.) x P(p.) + (1 -IR'(a, (3, Jl.)) x IP''('P'I'P) 
and then let: 
r = { ii<,l if fir.,) is more interesting than IP'' ( 'P' I'P) 
(p.) IP''('P'I'P) otherwise 
A general measure of whether ij(p.) is more interesting than 
IP''('P'I'P) is: IK(fir.,.JIIIlll(<p'I'P)) > IK(IP''('P'I'P)IIIlll(<p'I'P)), where 
IK(£1117) = Lj Xj In* is the Kullback-Leibler distance be-
tween two probability distributions x andy [11]. 
Finally incorporating Eqn. 2 we obtain the method for 
updating a distribution IP''('P'I'P) on receipt of a message Jl.: 
(3) 
This procedure deals with integrity decay, and with two 
probabilities: first, the probability z in the utterance Jl., and 
second the belief IR'(a, (3, Jl.) that a attached to Jl.· 
4.3 Update ofiP''(¢'1¢) given 'P 
The sim method: Given as above J1. = illoc(a, (3, <p, t) and 
the observation 'Pk we define the vector f by 
ti = IP''(¢;1¢) + (1- I Sim(<pk, <p)- Sim(¢i, ¢)I)· Sim(<pk, ¢) 
with { ¢1, ¢2, ... , ¢p} the set of all possible observations in 
the context of¢ and i = 1, ... ,p. f is not a probability 
distribution. The multiplying factor Sim( <p1 , ¢) limits the 
variation of probability to those formulae whose ontologi-
cal context is not too far away from the observation. The 
posterior IP''+l(¢'1¢) is obtained with Equation 3 with T(p.) 
defined to be the normalisation of f. 
The valuation method: For a given ¢k, wexp(¢k) = 
l:j:11P''(¢il¢k) · w(¢i) is a's expectation of the value of 
what will be observed given that f3 has stated that ¢k will 
be observed, for some measure w. Now suppose that, as 
before, a observes 'Pk after agent f3 has stated <p. a revises 
the prior estimate of the expected valuation wexp ( ¢k) in the 
light of the observation 'Pk to: 
(w'ev(¢Jk) I ('Pki'P)) = 
g(wexp(¢k), Sim(¢k, <p), w(¢k), w(<p), Wi('Pk)) 
for some function §- the idea being, for example, that if the 
execution, 'Pk, of the commitment, <p, to supply cheese was 
devalued then a's expectation of the value of a commitment, 
¢, to supply wine should decrease. We estimate the posterior 
by applying the principle of minimum relative entropy as for 
Equation 3, where the distribution P(p.) = P(<P'I<P) satisfies the 
constraint: 
p 
I>(<p',<p)j. Wi(¢j) = 
j=l 
5. SUMMARY MEASURES 
A dialogue, w', between agents a and (3 is a sequence of 
inter-related utterances in context. A relationship, >J!*', is a 
sequence of dialogues. We first measure the confidence that 
an agent has for another by observing, for each utterance, 
the difference between what is said (the utterance) and what 
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subsequently occurs (the observation). Second we evaluate 
each dialogue as it progresses in terms of the LOGIC frame-
work - this evaluation employs the confidence measures. 
Finally we define the intimacy of a relationship as an aggre-
gation of the value of its component dialogues. 
5.1 Confidence 
Confidence measures generalise what are commonly called 
trust, reliability and reputation measures into a single com-
putational framework that spans the LOGIC categories. In 
Section 5.2 confidence measures are applied to valuing fulfil-
ment of promises in the Legitimacy category - we formerly 
called this "honour" [14], to the execution of commitments 
- we formerly called this "trust" [13], and to valuing di-
alogues in the Goals category - we formerly called this 
"reliability" [14]. 
Ideal observations. Consider a distribution of observa-
tions that represent a's "ideal" in the sense that it is the 
best that a could reasonably expect to observe. This dis-
tribution will be a function of a's context with (3 denoted 
bye, and is IP'}(cp'lcp,e). Here we measure the relative en-
tropy between this ideal distribution, IP'}(cp'lcp, e), and the 
distribution of expected observations, IP'' ( cp'lcp). That is: 
""'( f3 ) "'"'IP''( 'I )I IP'}(cp'lcp,e) 
"-" a, , cp = 1-~ I cp cp, e og IP''(cp'lcp) 
'P' 
(4) 
where the "1" is an arbitrarily chosen constant being the 
maximum value that this measure may have. This equation 
measures confidence for a single statement cp. It makes sense 
to aggregate these values over a class of statements, say over 
those cp that are in the ontological context o, that is cp ::; o: 
IC(a, (3, o) = 1- L:.,,.,<o IP'~(cp) [1 ~ IC(a, (3, cp)] 
L:.,,.,:o;o IP' {3 ( cp) 
where IP'~(cp) is a probability distribution over the space of 
statements that the next statement (3 will make to a is cp. 
Similarly, for an overall estimate of (3's confidence in a: 
IC(a,(3) = 1- 2:::1P'~(cp) [1- IC(a,(3,cp)] 
'P 
Preferred observations. The previous measure requires 
that an ideal distribution, IP'}( cp'lcp, e), has to be specified for 
each cp. Here we measure the extent to which the observa-
tion cp' is preferable to the original statement cp. Given a 
predicate Prefer(c1, c2, e) meaning that a prefers c1 to c2 in 
environment e. Then if cp ::; o: 
IC(a, (3, cp) = 2::: IP''(Prefer(cp', cp, o))IP''(cp'lcp) 
'P' 
and: 
""'( (3 ) - L:.,,.,<o IP'~(cp)IC(a, (3, cp) 
"-" a, , o - " , ( ) 
LJ'P''P:So IP' {3 cp 
Certainty in observation. Here we measure the consis-
tency in expected acceptable observations, or "the lack of 
expected uncertainty in those possible observations that are 
better than the original statement". lfcp::; olet: <I>+(cp,o,~~;) = 
{ cp' liP'' (Prefer( cp', cp, o)) > "} for some constant ~~;, and: 
IC(a, (3, cp) = 1 + ~. · 2::: IP'~(cp'lcp) log!P'~(cp'lcp) 
<p1E4>+('P,o,K) 
where IP'~(cp'lcp) is the normalisation of IP''(cp'lcp) for cp' E 
<I>+(cp, o, ~~;), 
B*- {1 
- log I<I>+(cp, o, ")I 
if I<I>+(cp,o,~~;)l = 1 
otherwise 
As above we aggregate this measure for observations in a 
particular context o, and measure confidence as before. 
Computational Note. The various measures given above 
involve extensive calculations. For example, Eqn. 4 contains 
L:.,, that sums over all possible observations cp'. We obtain 
a more computationally friendly measure by appealing to 
the structure of the ontology described in Section 3.2, and 
the right-hand side of Eqn. 4 may be approximated to: 
1 - "'"' IP'' ( 'I ) I IP'~,~(cp'lcp, e) ~ ~.I cp cp, e og IP'' (cp'lcp) 
cp 1 :Sim(V'',cp);:::'tJ 77 
where IP'~,I('P'Icp, e) is the normalisation of IP'}(cp'lcp, e) for 
Sim(cp', cp) ~ ry, and similarly for IP'~(cp'lcp). The extent 
of this calculation is controlled by the parameter 'f/· An 
even tighter restriction may be obtained with: Sim( cp', cp) ~ 
'f/ and cp' ::; 'if; for some 'if;. 
5.2 Valuing negotiation dialogues 
Suppose that a negotiation commences at time s, and by 
time t a string of utterances, <I>' = (JL1, ... , f.Ln) has been 
exchanged between agent a and agent (3. This negotia-
tion dialogue is evaluated by a in the context of a's world 
model at time s, Ms, and the environment e that includes 
utterances that may have been received from other agents 
in the system including the information sources {lh}. Let 
w' = (<I>', M•, e), then a estimates the value of this dialogue 
to itself in the context of Ms and e as a 2 x 5 array Va(w') 
where: 
, _ (I~(w') 
Vx('ll ) - U~(W') I~(w') U~(W') 
I;'(w') 
u;'(w') I;;(w')) u;;(w') 
where the I(-) and U(·) functions are information-based and 
utility-based measures respectively as we now describe. a 
estimates the value of this dialogue to (3 as Vfl(w') by as-
suming that (3's reasoning apparatus mirrors its own. 
In general terms, the information-based valuations mea-
sure the reduction in uncertainty, or information gain, that 
the dialogue gives to each agent, they are expressed in terms 
of decrease in entropy that can always be calculated. The 
utility-based valuations measure utility gain are expressed in 
terms of "some suitable" utility evaluation function 1[] ( ·) that 
can be difficult to define. This is one reason why the utilitar-
ian approach has no natural extension to the management 
of argumentation that is achieved here by our information-
based approach. For example, if a receives the utterance 
"Today is Tuesday" then this may be translated into a con-
straint on a single distribution, and the resulting decrease 
in entropy is the information gain. Attaching a utilitarian 
measure to this utterance may not be so simple. 
We use the term "2 x 5 array" loosely to describe Va in 
that the elements of the array are lists of measures that will 
be determined by the agent's requirements. Table 2 shows 
a sample measure for each of the ten categories, in it the 
dialogue commences at time s and terminates at time t. 
In that Table, lU(-) is a suitable utility evaluation function, 
needs((3, x) means "agent (3 needs the need x", cho((3, x, 'Y) 
means "agent (3 satisfies need x by choosing to negotiate 
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with agent "'", N is the set of needs chosen from the on-
tology at some suitable level of abstraction, T' is the set 
of offers on the table at timet, com(/3,"(,b) means "agent 
{3 has an outstanding commitment with agent "! to execute 
the commitment b" where b is defined in the ontology at 
some suitable level of abstraction, B is the number of such 
commitments, and there are n + 1 agents in the system. 
5.3 Intimacy and Balance 
The balance in a negotiation dialogue, 1¥', is defined as: 
Ba/3(1¥') = Va('lr') 8 V13(1¥') for an element-by-element dif-
ference operator e that respects the structure of V(w'). 
The intimacy between agents a and /3, I~~' is the pattern 
of the two 2 x 5 arrays VC:' and V;' that are computed by 
an update function as each negotiation round terminates, 
I~~ = (VC:', Vti'). If 1¥' terminates at time t: 
v;'+l = v X Vx('lr') + (1- v) X v;' (5) 
where v is the learning rate, and x = a, {3. Additionally, 
Vx*' continually decays by: V;t+l = T X Vx*' + (1 - T) X 
Dx, where x = a, {3; T is the decay rate, and Dx is a 2 x 
5 array being the decay limit distribution for the value to 
agent x of the intimacy of the relationship in the absence 
of any interaction. Dx is the reputation of agent x. The 
relationship balance between agents a and {3 is: B~~ = VC:'e 
Vti'. In particular, the intimacy determines values for the 
parameters g and h in Equation 1. As a simple example, if 
both I~(w*') and IJf(w*') increase then g decreases, and as 
the remaining eight information-based LOGIC components 
increase, h increases. 
The notion of balance may be applied to pairs of utter-
ances by treating them as degenerate dialogues. In simple 
multi-issue bargaining the equitable information revelation 
strategy generalises the tit-for- tat strategy in single-issue 
bargaining, and extends to a tit-for-tat argumentation strat-
egy by applying the same principle across the LOGIC frame-
work. 
6. STRATEGIES AND TACTICS 
Each negotiation has to achieve two goals. First it may 
be intended to achieve some contractual outcome. Second 
it will aim to contribute to the growth, or decline, of the 
relationship intimacy. 
We now describe in greater detail the contents of the "Ne-
gotiation" box in Figure 1. The negotiation literature con-
sistently advises that an agent's behaviour should not be 
predictable even in close, intimate relationships. The re-
quired variation of behaviour is normally described as vary-
ing the negotiation stance that informally varies from "frie-
ndly guy" to "tough guy". The stance is shown in Figure 1, 
it injects bounded random noise into the process, where the 
bound tightens as intimacy increases. The stance, s;,13 , is a 
2 x 5 matrix of randomly chosen multipliers, each ~ 1, that 
perturbs a's actions. The value in the (x, y) position in the 
matrix, where x = I, U and y = L, 0, G, I, C, is chosen at 
random from [~(P 1 ),l(I~~,x,y)] where l(I~~,x,y) is the 
a{3'x,y 
bound, and I~~ is the intimacy. 
The negotiation strategy is concerned with maintaining a 
working set of Options. If the set of options is empty then 
a will quit the negotiation. a perturbs the acceptance ma-
chinery (see Section 4) by deriving s from the s;,13 matrix 
such as the value at the (I, 0) position. In line with the 
comment in Footnote 7, in the early stages of the negotia-
tion a may decide to inflate her opening Options. This is 
achieved by increasing the value of s in Equation 1. The fol-
lowing strategy uses the machinery described in Section 4. 
Fix h, g, s and c, set the Options to the empty set, Jet 
D! = {81 JI>'(acc(a,{3,x,8) > c}, then: 
• repeat the following as many times as desired: add 
8 = arg maxx{JI>'(acc(/3, a, x)) I x E D!} to Options, 
remove {y E D! I Sim(y, 8) < k} for some k from D! 
By using JI>' ( acc(/3, a, 8)) this strategy reacts to {3's history 
of Propose and Reject utterances. 
Negotiation tactics are concerned with selecting some Op-
tions and wrapping them in argumentation. Prior interac-
tions with agent {3 will have produced an intimacy pattern 
expressed in the form of (VC:', Vti'). Suppose that the rela-
tionship target is (T;', r;'). Following from Equation 5, a 
will want to achieve a negotiation target, N13(1¥') such that: 
v · N13(1¥') + (1- v) · Vti' is "a bit on the r;' side of" V,j': 
(6) 
for small K- E [0, v] that represents a's desired rate of de-
velopment for her relationship with {3. N13(1¥') is a 2 x 5 
matrix containing variations in the LOGIC dimensions that 
a would like to reveal to {3 during 1¥' (e.g. I'll pass a bit 
more information on options than usual, I'll be stronger 
in concessions on options, etc.). It is reasonable to ex-
pect {3 to progress towards her target at the same rate and 
Na('lr') is calculated by replacing {3 by a in Equation 6. 
Na('lr') is what a hopes to receive from {3 during 1¥'. This 
gives a negotiation balance target of: Na('lr') eN13(1¥') that 
can be used as the foundation for reactive tactics by striv-
ing to maintain this balance across the LOGIC dimensions. 
A cautious tactic could use the balance to bound the re-
sponse f.L to each utterance f.L1 from {3 by the constraint: 
V.,,(f.L') 8 Vf3(f.L) ~ s;,13 0 (Na('lr') 8 N13(1¥')), where 0 is 
element-by-element matrix multiplication, and s;,13 is the 
stance. A Jess neurotic tactic could attempt to achieve the 
target negotiation balance over the anticipated complete di-
alogue. If a balance bound requires negative information 
revelation in one LOGIC category then a will contribute 
nothing to it, and will leave this to the natural decay to the 
reputation D as described above. 
7. DISCUSSION 
In this paper we have introduced a novel approach to ne-
gotiation that uses information and game-theoretical mea-
sures grounded on business and psychological studies. It 
introduces the concepts of intimacy and balance as key ele-
ments in understanding what is a negotiation strategy and 
tactic. Negotiation is understood as a dialogue that affect 
five basic dimensions: Legitimacy, Options, Goals, Indepen-
dence, and Commitment. Each dialogical move produces a 
change in a 2 x 5 matrix that evaluates the dialogue along five 
information-based measures and five utility-based measures. 
The current Balance and intimacy levels and the desired, or 
target, levels are used by the tactics to determine what to 
say next. We are currently exploring the use of this model as 
an extension of a currently widespread eProcurement soft-
ware commercialised by iSOCO, a spin-off company of the 
laboratory of one of the authors. 
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I~(w') = L C'(a, (3, cp)- C'(a, (3, cp) U~(w') = L Lll'~(cp'Jcp) x lUa(cp') 
cpEilrt <pEWt tp1 
0 t L6ET' llll8 (acc((3,a,o))- L6ET' nn'(acc((3,a,8)) ~(\II)= ~·J U~(w') = L ll''(acc((3,a,o)) x L::n>'(O'Jo)lUa(o') 
OeTt 0' 
G t LxEN llll'(needs((3, x))- nn'(needs((3, x)) 
I"' (\II)= JNJ u:?(w') = L ll''(needs((3, x)) X JE'(1Ua(needs((3, x))) 
xEN 
1 , L~-lLxENllll'(cho((3,x,f3,)) -llll'(cho((3,x,f3,)) 
Ia(\II ) = n x JNJ U!(w') = t L 1IJ'(cho((3,x,f3,)) -1IJ8 (cho((3,x,f3,)) 
i=l xEN 
c t L~-1 L6EB llll 8 (com((3, (3,, b))- nn'(com((3, (3,, b)) 
I"' (\II ) = n x JBJ 
0 
U~(w') = L L 1IJ'(com((3,(3,, b)) -1IJ8 (com((3,(3,, b)) 
i=l OEB 
Table 2: Sample measures for each category in Va(w'). (Similarly for V13(\II').) 
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